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Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) offers the prospect of distributing secret
keys with only minimal security assumptions, by making use of a Bell violation. However, existing
DIQKD security proofs have low noise tolerances, making a proof-of-principle demonstration cur-
rently infeasible. We investigate whether the noise tolerance can be improved by using advantage
distillation, which refers to using two-way communication instead of the one-way error-correction
currently used in DIQKD security proofs. We derive an efficiently verifiable condition to certify
that advantage distillation is secure against collective attacks in a variety of DIQKD scenarios, and
use this to show that it can indeed allow higher noise tolerances, which could help to pave the way
towards an experimental implementation of DIQKD.
Introduction — In quantum key distribution, the goal
is to extract a key from correlations obtained by measur-
ing quantum systems. Device-independent quantum key
distribution (DIQKD) is based on the observation that
when these correlations violate a Bell inequality, a secure
key can be extracted even if the users’ devices are not
fully characterised [1–4]. In a DIQKD security proof, it is
merely assumed that the devices do not signal to the ad-
versary or other components except when foreseen by the
protocol [1–3]. This differs from traditional QKD proto-
cols [5], which are device-dependent in that they assume
the devices are implementing operations within specified
tolerances [6]. Implementations of such protocols have
been attacked by various methods [7–9], which exploit
imperfections that cause the devices to operate outside
the prescribed models. By working with fewer assump-
tions, DIQKD can achieve secure key distribution with-
out detailed device characterisation, which would make
the systems more reliable against such attacks.
Unfortunately, there has been substantial difficulty in
finding security proofs for DIQKD protocols with suffi-
cient noise tolerance for physical implementation. One
approach towards improving the tolerance is to inves-
tigate the information-reconciliation step. In QKD, the
raw data of the users is not perfectly correlated, and they
need to agree on a shared key using public communica-
tion. Existing DIQKD security proofs [1, 3] have used
one-way error-correction protocols in this step. How-
ever, for classical key reconciliation [10, 11] and device-
dependent QKD [12–17], the noise tolerance can be im-
proved by using two-way communication, a concept that
has been referred to as advantage distillation.
It is natural to ask whether this concept could be
extended to DIQKD. However, device-dependent secu-
rity proofs for advantage distillation are often based on
detailed state characterisations, given by measurements
that are tomographically complete or nearly so [12–17].
This is generally not available in noisy DIQKD scenar-
ios, where there can be many states and measurements
compatible with the observed statistics. While recent
works [18, 19] have found upper bounds on DIQKD key
rates even with two-way communication, there do not ap-
pear to be any achievability results resolving the question
of whether two-way communication provides an advan-
tage in DIQKD.
In this work, we answer this question in the affirma-
tive, by showing that advantage distillation yields better
noise tolerances than one-way error correction in several
scenarios. Our key observation is that even with the lim-
ited state characterisation available in DIQKD, it is still
possible to identify and bound some important param-
eters that can be used in a security proof. We present
our results in the form of several sufficient conditions
for advantage distillation to be secure, together with a
semidefinite programming (SDP) method to verify when
these conditions hold.
Our security proof is valid in the collective-attacks
regime, where one assumes all states and measurements
are independent and identically distributed (IID) across
the protocol rounds, but the adversary Eve can store
quantum side-information and perform joint measure-
ments on her collected states [6]. Other attack models
include individual attacks, where Eve has no quantum
memory, or the most general coherent attacks, where the
IID assumption is removed. Collective attacks can be
stronger than individual attacks [15, 20], but are often
no weaker than coherent attacks [3, 6]; we focus on col-
lective attacks here.
We focus on improving the asymptotic noise-tolerance
thresholds, i.e. the maximum noise at which key gener-
ation is still possible in the limit of many rounds. This
is an important parameter when considering a proof-of-
principle realisation of DIQKD. Our approach also yields
lower bounds on the asymptotic key rate [21].
Conditions for security — Consider a DIQKD proto-
col between two parties Alice and Bob, where Alice has
X possible measurements A0, A1, ..., AX−1, and similarly
Bob has Y possible measurements B0, B1, ..., BY−1, with
A0, B0 taken to be binary-outcome measurements that
generate a raw key. Eve holds a purification E of Al-
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2ice and Bob’s states, and under the collective-attack as-
sumption the states and measurements are IID, so we
can focus on the single-round Alice-Bob-Eve state ρABE .
We assume that the devices do not eventually broadcast
the final key through methods such as device-reuse at-
tacks [22] or covert channels [23]. This assumption could
be supported by implementing measures such as those
proposed in [22–25].
Given the IID structure, parameter estimation can be
performed to arbitrary accuracy, so we shall assume the
outcome probabilities PrAB|XY (ab|xy) for all measure-
ment pairs (Ax, By) are fully characterised in the proto-
col. (We will suppress subscripts for probability distri-
butions when they are clear from context.) For conve-
nience in the proofs, we assume a symmetrisation step
is implemented, in which Alice generates a uniform ran-
dom bit T in each round and sends it to Bob, with both
parties flipping their measurement outcome if and only
if T = 1 [26]. The bit T can be absorbed into Eve’s
side-information E. (This symmetrisation step can be
omitted in practice; see [21] Sec. C.) After this process,
the measurements A0 and B0 have symmetrised out-
comes, in the sense Pr(01|00) = Pr(10|00) = /2 and
Pr(00|00) = Pr(11|00) = (1− )/2 for some  < 1/2 [27].
Henceforth, PrAB|XY refers to the distribution after sym-
metrisation.
We focus on the repetition-code protocol [10, 11, 14, 15]
for advantage distillation, which is based on a block of
n rounds in which A0 and B0 were measured (we shall
denote the output bitstrings as A0 and B0, and Eve’s
side-information across all the rounds as E). Alice pri-
vately generates a uniformly random bit C, and sends
the message M = A0 ⊕ (C,C, ..., C) to Bob via a public
authenticated channel. Bob replies with a bit D that ex-
presses whether to accept the block, with D = 1 (accept)
if and only if B0⊕M = (C ′, C ′, ..., C ′) for some C ′ ∈ Z2.
If the resulting systems satisfy
r := H(C|EM ;D = 1)−H(C|C ′;D = 1) > 0, (1)
where H is the von Neumann entropy, then repeat-
ing this procedure over many n-round blocks would al-
low a secret key to be distilled asymptotically from the
bits (C,C ′) in the accepted blocks [3, 28]. Exclud-
ing parameter-estimation rounds, the key rate will be
r(n + (1− )n)/n [14].
We derive [21] the following theorem (where F (ρ, σ) =∥∥√ρ√σ∥∥
1
is the root-fidelity):
Theorem 1. For a DIQKD protocol as described above,
a sufficient condition for Eq. (1) to hold for large n is
F (ρE|00, ρE|11)2 >

1−  , (2)
where ρE|a0b0 is Eve’s single-round state conditioned on
(A0, B0) being measured with outcome (a0, b0).
The intuition behind the proof is that if Eve sees the
message value M =m, then with high probability Alice
and Bob’s strings have the value A0B0 = mm or mm
(wherem :=m⊕1). Hence Eve essentially has to distin-
guish between these two cases, which can be quantified
via the fidelity F (ρE|mm, ρE|mm) = F (ρE|00, ρE|11)n.
Eq. (2) is similar to the condition obtained in [15] for
device-dependent QKD, but it is derived here without de-
tailed state characterisation. However, it still remains to
find bounds on F (ρE|00, ρE|11) without device-dependent
assumptions. We approach this task by combining the
Fuchs–van de Graaf inequality [29] with the operational
interpretation of trace distance:
F (ρE|00, ρE|11) ≥ 1− d(ρE|00, ρE|11)
= 2(1− Pg(ρE|00, ρE|11)),
(3)
where Pg(ρE|00, ρE|11) is Eve’s maximum probability of
guessing C given the E part of a c-q state σCE =∑
c(1/2) |c〉〈c|⊗ρE|cc. In a DIQKD protocol as described
above, Pg(ρE|00, ρE|11) can be viewed as Eve’s guessing
probability for the outcome of A0B0, conditioned on the
outcome being 00 or 11. A DI method to bound such
guessing probabilities based on the distribution PrAB|XY
was described in [30], using the family of SDPs known as
the NPA hierarchy [31]. We can hence apply this method
to find whether Eq. (2) holds for various distributions.
However, Eq. (3) is generally not an optimal bound.
We observe that if ρE|00 and ρE|11 were both assumed to
be pure, then it could be replaced by a better relation,
F (ρE|00, ρE|11)2 = 1− d(ρE|00, ρE|11)2. (4)
While it seems difficult to justify such an assumption
in general, we show that for 2-input 2-output protocols,
one can almost replace Eq. (3) with Eq. (4) after taking
a particular concave envelope [21]:
Theorem 2. Consider a DIQKD protocol as described
above, with X = Y = 2 and all measurements hav-
ing binary outcomes. Denoting the set of quantum dis-
tributions with Pr(00|00) = Pr(11|00) as S, let f be
a concave function on S such that for any γ ∈ S,
all states and measurements compatible with γ satisfy
f(γ) ≥ (1 − )d(ρE|00, ρE|11)2. Then a sufficient con-
dition for Eq. (1) to hold for large n is
1− f(PrAB|XY )
1−  >

1−  . (5)
Currently, we do not have a method for finding an op-
timal concave bound on (1−)d(ρE|00, ρE|11)2. However,
we find a condition that is more restrictive than Eq. (5)
but more tractable to verify:
Corollary 1. Consider a DIQKD protocol as described
above, with X = Y = 2 and all measurements having
3TABLE I. Noise thresholds for advantage distillation in various DIQKD scenarios. Prtarget is the ideal probability distribution
that the devices should implement in the absence of noise, and qt is the maximum depolarising noise such that we can show
positive key rate is achievable using Theorem 1 (for rows (i)–(iii)) or Corollary 1 (for rows (iv)–(vi)). Analogously, ηt is the
minimum efficiency which can be tolerated when we instead consider a limited-detection-efficiency model. Unless otherwise
specified, the state used for Prtarget is
∣∣Φ+〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2.
Description of Prtarget State and measurements for Prtarget qt ηt
(i) Achieves maximal CHSH value
with the measurements
A0, A1, B1, B2.
A0 = B0 = Z, A1 = X,
B1 = (X + Z)/
√
2, B2 = (X − Z)/
√
2. 6.0% 93.7%
(ii) Modification of a distribution
exhibiting the Hardy paradox [32, 33]
for improved robustness against
limited detection efficiency.
|ψ〉 = √κ(|01〉+ |10〉) +√1− 2κ |11〉 with κ = (3−√5)/2;
the 0 outcomes correspond to projectors onto
|a0〉 = |b0〉 ∝
(√
1 + 2κ−√1− 2κ) |0〉+ 2√κ |1〉,
|a1〉 = |b1〉 ≈ 0.37972 |0〉+ 0.92510 |1〉,
|a2〉 = |b2〉 ≈ 0.90821 |0〉+ 0.41851 |1〉.
3.2% 92.0%
(iii) Includes the Mayers-Yao
self-test [34] and the CHSH
measurements.
A0 = B0 = Z, A1 = B1 = (X + Z)/
√
2,
A2 = B2 = X, A3 = B3 = (X − Z)/
√
2. 6.8% 92.7%
(iv) Achieves maximal CHSH value
with the measurements
A0, A1, B0, B1.
A0 = Z, A1 = X,
B0 = (X + Z)/
√
2, B1 = (X − Z)/
√
2. 7.7% 91.7%
(v) Similar to (iv), but with
measurements optimised for
robustness against depolarising noise.
Measurements are in the x-z plane at angles
θA0 = 0.4187, θA1 = 1.7900, θB0 = 0.8636, θB1 = 2.6340.
9.1% 90.0%
(vi) Similar to (iv), but with states
and measurements maximising
CHSH violation for each value of
detection efficiency η [35].
|ψ〉 = cos Ω |00〉+ sin Ω |11〉 with Ω = 0.6224; the 0
outcomes correspond to projectors onto states of the form
cos(θ/2) |0〉+ sin(θ/2) |1〉 with
θA0 = −θB0 = −0.35923, θA1 = −θB1 = 1.1538.
7.3% 89.1%
binary outcomes. Then a sufficient condition for Eq. (1)
to hold for large n is
1− d(ρE|00, ρE|11) > 
1−  . (6)
As before, we can bound d(ρE|00, ρE|11) by using the
NPA hierarchy. Effectively, Corollary 1 improves over
the combination of Theorem 1 and Eq. (3) by replacing(
1− d(ρE|00, ρE|11)
)2 with 1− d(ρE|00, ρE|11).
Noise thresholds — Using this method, we study the
effects of two possible noise models for binary-outcome
distributions. The first is depolarising noise parametrised
by q ∈ [0, 1/2]:
Pr(ab|xy) = (1− 2q)Prtarget(ab|xy) + q/2, (7)
where Prtarget is some ideal target distribution [36].
The second noise model is limited detection efficiency
parametrised by η ∈ [0, 1], where all outcomes are sub-
jected to independent Z-channels that flip 1 to 0 with
probability 1 − η. This is a standard model for pho-
tonic setups where photon loss or non-detection occurs
with probability 1− η, with such events assigned to out-
come 0 [1]. (η is an effective parameter describing all
such losses. Given more detailed noise models [37], our
method can be applied to the resulting distributions for
more precise results.)
In Table I, we present a selection of our results (see [21]
for the full list). Additionally, in Fig. 1 we plot both
sides of Eq. (6) for row (iv) of the table. From the ta-
ble, we see that appropriate choices of Prtarget can tol-
erate depolarising noise of qt ≈ 9.1% or detection ef-
ficiencies of ηt ≈ 89.1%. This indeed outperforms the
DIQKD protocol in [1] based on one-way error correc-
tion, which can tolerate qt ≈ 7.1% or ηt ≈ 92.4% (or
ηt ≈ 90.7% for a modified version where the state and
measurements A0, A1, B1, B2 are optimised to maximise
the CHSH value for each value of η [35], and B0 is then
separately optimised to be maximally correlated to A0).
We observe that the DIQKD protocol in [1] uses essen-
tially the same Prtarget as row (i) in Table I. This is not
a 2-input 2-output scenario, and so the noise thresholds
we can prove for that specific setup are somewhat worse.
However, row (iv) is in fact the same scenario with one
measurement omitted, making it a 2-input 2-output sce-
nario, thus we could use Corollary 1 to show that advan-
tage distillation in this scenario can surpass the thresh-
olds in [1]. Hence we have shown that for the scenario
in [1], advantage distillation achieves a higher noise tol-
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FIG. 1. Left- and right-hand sides of Eq. (6), shown as solid and dashed curves respectively, for a DIQKD scenario where
the target distribution attains maximum CHSH violation in the absence of noise. Plot (a) shows the effect of depolarising
noise q, while in plot (b) a small amount of depolarising noise is applied (q = 0.1% for the black curve, q = 1% for the blue
curve) followed by a limited-detection-efficiency noise model with efficiency η. In plots (a) and (b), the solid and dashed curves
intersect at qt ≈ 7.7% and ηt ≈ 91.7% (black), 92.6% (blue) respectively, which yield the threshold values such that we can
show positive key rate is achievable via Corollary 1. The solid curves reach zero at the same noise values as where the CHSH
violation becomes zero.
erance even while ignoring one measurement. This is
particularly surprising since the key-generating measure-
ments in row (iv) are not perfectly correlated. In fact,
if the proof in [1] were applied to this scenario [38], it
would only tolerate noise up to qt ≈ 3.1%. If we instead
allow optimisation of the states and measurements for
noise robustness, then the relevant rows are (v) and (vi),
where the noise thresholds we find for advantage distilla-
tion also outperform one-way error correction.
In Table I, the noise thresholds for scenarios with
more than 2 inputs are generally worse, because for such
scenarios we cannot apply Corollary 1. The best re-
sults we have for such cases are listed in rows (ii) and
(iii). It would be of interest to find a way to overcome
this issue, perhaps by finding more direct bounds on
F (ρE|00, ρE|11), or further study of when the analysis can
be reduced to states satisfying Eq. (4). We observe that
pure states are not the only states satisfying the equation
— for instance, if ρE|00 and ρE|11 are qubit states, the
equality holds if and only if they have the same eigenval-
ues (see [21] Sec. F).
Conclusion and outlook — In summary, we have found
that by using advantage distillation, the noise thresh-
olds for DIQKD with one-way error correction can be
surpassed. Specifically, advantage distillation is secure
against collective attacks up to depolarising-noise values
of q ≈ 9.1% or detection efficiencies of η ≈ 89.1%, which
exceeds the best-known noise thresholds of q ≈ 7.1% and
η ≈ 90.7% respectively for DIQKD with one-way error
correction.
Currently, we require large block sizes n to certify
positive key rates. However, small block sizes are suf-
ficient for reasonable asymptotic key rates in the device-
dependent case [14]. Tighter bounds on F (ρE|00, ρE|11)
should give similar results in DIQKD, hence this would
be an important next step. Alternatively, one could anal-
yse the finite-key security [3, 39, 40]. Since our approach
yields explicit bounds [21] on the entropies in Eq. (1),
it could in principle be extended to a finite-size security
proof against collective attacks by using the quantum
asymptotic equipartition property [41], following the ap-
proach in [40]. However, this approach is likely to require
a large number of rounds to achieve positive key rates,
which would pose a challenge for practical implementa-
tion.
Another significant goal would be extending our results
to non-IID scenarios. We conjecture that allowing co-
herent attacks will not change the asymptotic key rates,
as was the case for various device-dependent QKD and
DIQKD protocols [3, 6]. To support this, we observe that
if the measurements have an IID tensor-product struc-
ture, then the analysis of any permutation-symmetric
protocol can be asymptotically reduced to the IID case
using de Finetti theorems [14], assuming the system di-
mensions are bounded. Hence any attack that can be
modelled by simply using non-IID states (with IID mea-
surements) cannot yield an asymptotic advantage over
collective attacks (see [21] Sec. E). To find a security
proof for non-IID measurements, the entropy accumula-
tion theorem [3, 42] or a new type of de Finetti theorem
may be required.
Finally, an open question in information theory is the
existence of bound information, referring to correlations
which require secret bits to be produced but from
5which no secret key can be extracted [17, 43]. There
is a simple analogue to this in the context of DIQKD,
namely whether there exist correlations which violate
Bell inequalities but cannot be distilled into a secret key
in a DI setting. Our results have a gap between the
noise thresholds at which we can no longer prove the
protocol’s security and the thresholds at which the Bell
violation becomes zero (see also [21] Sec. E, where we
outline a potential attack for q >∼ 12.8% if the users only
measure  and the CHSH value). It would be of interest
to find whether this gap can be closed.
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Supplemental Material
A. PROOF DETAILS
For completeness, we repeat the protocol description: consider the outputs of a block of n rounds in which A0 and
B0 were measured (we shall denote the output bitstrings as A0 and B0, and Eve's side-information across all the
rounds as E). Alice privately generates a uniformly random bit C, and sends the messageM = A0 ⊕ (C,C, ..., C) to
Bob via a public authenticated channel. Bob replies with a single bit D that expresses whether to accept the block,
with D = 1 (accept) if and only if B0 ⊕M = (C ′, C ′, ..., C ′) for some C ′ ∈ Z2. If the resulting systems satisfy
H(C|EM ;D = 1)−H(C|C ′;D = 1) > 0, (1)
then repeating this procedure over many n-round blocks would allow a secret key to be distilled asymptotically from
the bitstrings C,C ′ in the accepted blocks [S1, S2]. We assume a symmetrisation step is implemented, and denote
the resulting distribution as PrAB|XY . The statements and proofs of the theorems are as follows:
Theorem 1. For a DIQKD protocol as described above, a sufficient condition for Eq. (1) to hold for large n is
F (ρE|00, ρE|11)2 >

1−  , (2)
where ρE|a0b0 is Eve's single-round state conditioned on (A0, B0) being measured with outcome (a0, b0).
Proof. All states denoted in this proof are normalised. To bound H(C|EM ;D = 1), we first observe that since
H(X|Y Z) = ∑z PrZ(z)H(X|Y ;Z = z) for classical Z, it suffices to bound H(C|E;M = m ∧D = 1) for arbitrary
messages m. Starting from the initial A0B0E state
ρA0B0E =
∑
a0,b0
PrA0B0(a0, b0) |a0, b0〉〈a0, b0| ⊗ ρE|a0b0 , (S1)
a straightforward calculation shows that conditioned on the block being accepted and M = m, the CE state takes
the form ρCE|M=m∧D=1 =
∑
c(1/2) |c〉〈c| ⊗ ωc with
ω0 =
PrA0B0(m,m)ρE|mm + PrA0B0(m,m)ρE|mm
PrA0B0(m,m) + PrA0B0(m,m)
, ω1 =
PrA0B0(m,m)ρE|mm + PrA0B0(m,m)ρE|mm
PrA0B0(m,m) + PrA0B0(m,m)
,
(S2)
where m = m⊕ 1. We now consider a state ρ˜CE defined as follows:
ρ˜CE = (1/2)(|0〉〈0| ⊗ ρE|mm + |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρE|mm). (S3)
With symmetrised IID outcomes, we have PrA0B0(m,m) = PrA0B0(m,m) = (1 − )n/2n and PrA0B0(m,m) =
PrA0B0(m,m) = 
n/2n, so
d(ρ˜CE , ρCE|M=m∧D=1) ≤ δn, where δn = 
n
n + (1− )n . (S4)
Applying a continuity bound for conditional von Neumann entropy [S3] then yields
H(C|E;M = m ∧D = 1) ≥ H(C|E)ρ˜ − δn − (1 + δn)h2
(
δn
1 + δn
)
, (S5)
where h2 is the binary entropy function. The H(C|E)ρ˜ term is bounded by [S4][S5]
H(C|E)ρ˜ ≥ 1− h2
(
1− F (ρE|mm, ρE|mm)
2
)
= 1− h2
(
1− F (ρE|00, ρE|11)n
2
)
, (S6)
using the IID assumption. As for H(C|C ′;D = 1), it can be seen that Pr(C 6= C ′|D = 1) = δn for IID outcomes, so
H(C|C ′;D = 1) = h2(δn). (S7)
Combining these results, we conclude
H(C|EM ;D = 1)
H(C|C ′;D = 1) ≥
(
1− h2
(
1− F (ρE|00, ρE|11)n
2
)
− δn − (1 + δn)h2
(
δn
1 + δn
))
h2(δn)
−1. (S8)
2It remains to find the behaviour of this expression in the large-n limit. To do so, we first note that letting φ(δ) =
h2(δ/(1 + δ)), we have φ(δ), h2(δ)→ 0 and φ′(δ), h′2(δ)→∞ as δ → 0+, so
lim
δ→0+
δ
h2(δ)
= lim
δ→0+
1
h′2(δ)
= 0, (S9)
lim
δ→0+
φ(δ)
h2(δ)
= lim
δ→0+
φ′′(δ)
h′′2(δ)
= lim
δ→0+
(1 + δ − 2δ ln δ)/(δ(1 + δ)3)
1/(δ(1− δ)) = 1. (S10)
Since δn → 0+ as n→∞, the terms arising from the continuity bound hence have a finite limit,
lim
n→∞
(
−δn − (1 + δn)h2
(
δn
1 + δn
))
h2(δn)
−1 = −1. (S11)
Let β = /(1 − ) ∈ [0, 1). Then δn ≤ βn, and for sufficiently large n we have βn < 1/2, so h2(δn) ≤ h2(βn) ≤
2βn log(1/βn). Hence for any α > β,
lim
n→∞
αn
h2(δn)
≥ lim
n→∞
αn
2nβn log(1/β)
=∞. (S12)
The right-hand side of Eq. (S8) can be lower-bounded by using h2((1 − p)/2) ≤ 1 − p2/ ln 4 (this inequality follows
from the Taylor expansion of h2) to get 1 − h2
((
1− F (ρE|00, ρE|11)n
)
/2
) ≥ F (ρE|00, ρE|11)2n/ ln 4. Combining this
with the choice α = F (ρE|00, ρE|11)2 in Eq. (S12), we conclude that when Eq. (2) holds, the right-hand side of Eq. (S8)
limits to ∞ as n→∞. Therefore, Eq. (1) will hold for sufficiently large n.
Given specific values or bounds for F (ρE|00, ρE|11), , n, one can substitute them into Eq. (S8) to get an explicit
bound on the asymptotic key rate. Note that ρE|00 and ρE|11 refer to the states after the symmetrisation step is
implemented. The theorem can in fact be slightly broadened to encompass protocols without a symmetrisation step,
as long as PrAB|XY has symmetrised outcomes, since the latter property is all that is required in this proof. However,
since in any case the symmetrisation step can be omitted in practice via the analysis in Sec. C, this does not seem to
be a significant generalisation.
This security proof has a key difference in structure compared to a proof technique often used for QKD with one-
way error correction, for instance in [S2, S6, S7]. Specifically, in this proof we must consider the security of both
key-generating measurements (A0, B0), while the proofs for QKD with one-way error correction often only need to
bound the security of A0 (in terms of the smoothed min-entropy of the bitstring it produces). Broadly speaking, the
approach in those proofs works because when Alice sends the error-correction string to Bob, the information leakage to
Eve is bounded simply by the length of the string, which is fixed beforehand based on the expected honest behaviour
of the devices. For the repetition-code protocol, however, a large number of bits are publicly communicated, and
hence bounding the information leakage via the number of bits yields too crude a bound. The need to explicitly
consider the security of B0 in this protocol can also be seen by considering an extreme example where Eve always
knows the outcome of B0, possibly at the cost of it being poorly correlated to A0. In that case, regardless of how
secure the output of A0 is, Eve will always know the value of C
′, making it impossible to distill key from the (C,C ′)
pairs. Hence any security proof for this protocol must involve some kind of security argument regarding B0, even if
only indirectly via measuring its correlations with A0.
In the main text, we used the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequality to bound the fidelity F (ρE|00, ρE|11), but this is likely
not optimal, given the fairly large gap between the upper and lower bounds of the inequality. It might potentially be
possible to directly bound F (ρE|00, ρE|11) by relating it to higher moments of the NPA hierarchy, in the vein of one
approach for robust self-testing [S8]. Alternatively, one could perhaps use the fact that for any pair of states (ρ, σ),
there exists a measurement such that the resulting outcome distributions (P,Q) satisfy F (P,Q) = F (ρ, σ) [S9]. This
effectively allows a reduction to classical side-information, in which case the minimum value of F (P,Q) given the
observed PrAB|XY can be phrased as an optimisation problem analogous to [S10].
Theorem 2. Consider a DIQKD protocol as described above, with X = Y = 2 and all measurements having binary
outcomes. Denoting the set of quantum distributions with Pr(00|00) = Pr(11|00) as S, let f be a concave function on
S such that for any γ ∈ S, all states and measurements compatible with γ satisfy f(γ) ≥ (1− )d(ρE|00, ρE|11)2. Then
a sufficient condition for Eq. (1) to hold for large n is
1− f(PrAB|XY )
1−  >

1−  . (5)
3Proof. We use the fact that in a 2-input 2-output DI protocol, Jordan's lemma can be used to argue [S11, S12] that
without loss of generality, we can assume Eve's strategy in each round consists of generating a random variable Λ and
storing it in a classical register, then implementing some corresponding qubit strategy, which is a strategy such that
ρABE|λ is a 2× 2× 4 pure state and all of Alice and Bob's measurements are rank-1 projective measurements. For a
qubit strategy, Eve's state conditioned on the joint outcome of both measurements is pure. Hence if Alice and Bob
measure (Ax, By) and store their results in classical registers (A¯x, B¯y), we can take the resulting single-round state
ρA¯xB¯yEΛ after symmetrisation to be in the form [S13]
ρA¯xB¯yEΛ =
∑
a,b
∑
λ
Pr(ab|xyλ) Pr(λ) |a, b〉〈a, b| ⊗ ρE|λab ⊗ |λ〉〈λ| , (S13)
where the probabilities Pr(ab|xyλ) satisfy ∑λ Pr(ab|xyλ)Pr(λ) = Pr(ab|xy), and for each λ we have Pr(00|00λ) =
Pr(11|00λ) = (1− λ)/2 for some λ ∈ [0, 1], due to the symmetrisation step. Using the reduction to qubit strategies,
we can also take all ρE|λab to be pure states (see Sec. B). When Alice and Bob both perform the key-generating
measurements and get the same outcome (which we shall denote here as γ ∈ {0, 1}), Eve's conditional states are
ρEΛ|γγ =
∑
λ
P˜r(λ)ρE|λγγ ⊗ |λ〉〈λ| , where P˜r(λ) = Pr(γγ|00λ)
Pr(γγ|00) Pr(λ) =
1− λ
1−  Pr(λ). (S14)
Note that P˜r is itself a valid probability distribution over Λ, and independent of γ.
We now apply the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1 up until Eq. (S5), though in this case Eve's
side-information takes the form EΛ, and so we consider the state ρ˜CEΛ = (1/2)(|0〉〈0|⊗ρEΛ|mm+ |1〉〈1|⊗ρEΛ|mm).
Using the above, one can show that
ρ˜CEΛ =
∑
λ
P˜r(λ)
1
2
(|0〉〈0| ⊗ ρE|λmm + |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρE|λmm)⊗ |λ〉〈λ| , (S15)
where P˜r(λ) =
∏
j P˜r(λj) and ρE|λγγ =
⊗
j ρE|λjγjγj . Hence we have H(C|EΛ)ρ˜ =
∑
λ P˜r(λ)H(C|E; Λ = λ)ρ˜.
Applying the bound from [S4] together with h2((1− p)/2) ≤ 1− p2/ ln 4 then yields
H(C|EΛ)ρ˜ ≥
∑
λ
P˜r(λ)
(
1− h2
(
1− F (ρE|λmm, ρE|λmm)
2
))
≥ 1
ln 4
∑
λ
P˜r(λ)F (ρE|λmm, ρE|λmm)2. (S16)
Using the IID structure,
∑
λ
P˜r(λ)F (ρE|λmm, ρE|λmm)2 =
∑
λ
n∏
j=1
P˜r(λj)F
(
ρE|λj00, ρE|λj11
)2
=
(∑
λ
P˜r(λ)F
(
ρE|λ00, ρE|λ11
)2)n
. (S17)
Since the states ρE|λ00, ρE|λ11 are pure, they satisfy F (ρE|00, ρE|11)2 = 1− d(ρE|00, ρE|11)2, and so∑
λ
P˜r(λ)F
(
ρE|λ00, ρE|λ11
)2
= 1−
∑
λ
1− λ
1−  Pr(λ) d
(
ρE|λ00, ρE|λ11
)2 ≥ 1− 1
1− 
∑
λ
Pr(λ)f(PrAB|XY λ). (S18)
Finally, this is lower-bounded by 1− f(PrAB|XY )/(1− ) since f is concave, so
H(C|EΛM ;D = 1)
H(C|C ′;D = 1) ≥
(
1
ln 4
(
1− f(PrAB|XY )
1− 
)n
− δn − (1 + δn)h2
(
δn
1 + δn
))
h2(δn)
−1. (S19)
The behaviour of this expression in the large-n limit is given by the same analysis as the last part of the proof of
Theorem 1, choosing α = 1− f(PrAB|XY )/(1− ) in this case. We conclude that when Eq. (5) holds, the right-hand
side of Eq. (S19) limits to ∞ as n→∞. Therefore, Eq. (1) will hold for sufficiently large n.
Similar to Theorem 1, values can be substituted into Eq. (S19) to obtain explicit bounds on the key rate. Unlike
Theorem 1, the proof of this theorem does require an explicit symmetrisation step (see Sec. B), though the analysis in
Sec. C allows one to avoid implementing the symmetrisation step in practice. If f is the optimal concave upper bound
on (1− )d(ρE|00, ρE|11)2, in the sense that there always exists a mixture of qubit strategies such that
∑
λ Pr(λ)(1−
λ)d
(
ρE|λ00, ρE|λ11
)2
= f(PrAB|XY ), then the above analysis is essentially tight for large n. This is because in
Eq. (S16), the first inequality [S4] is in fact saturated because ρE|λmm, ρE|λmm are pure, and the second inequality
is approximately saturated at large n because h2((1− p)/2) = 1− p2/ ln 4−O(p4).
4Corollary 1. Consider a DIQKD protocol as described above, with X = Y = 2 and all measurements having binary
outcomes. Then a sufficient condition for Eq. (1) to hold for large n is
1− d(ρE|00, ρE|11) > 
1−  . (6)
Proof. Let f˜ be the optimal upper bound on (1− )d(ρE|00, ρE|11), defined on the set of quantum distributions such
that Pr(00|00) = Pr(11|00). Since d(ρE|00, ρE|11) ≤ 1, we have [S14]
f˜(PrAB|XY ) ≥ (1− )d(ρE|00, ρE|11) ≥ (1− )d(ρE|00, ρE|11)2. (S20)
Also, f˜ must be concave, for essentially the same reason that optimal guessing-probability bounds must be concave,
though modified to account for the postselection on the outcomes being 00 or 11. More specifically, denote the
set of quantum distributions with Pr(00|00) = Pr(11|00) as S. Consider any probability distribution Pr(λ) and
any family of distributions PrAB|XY λ ∈ S indexed by λ, and take an arbitrary δ > 0. For each λ, there exists
a strategy for Eve that achieves the distribution PrAB|XY λ and has (1 − λ)d
(
ρE|λ00, ρE|λ11
) ≥ f˜(PrAB|XY λ) − δ,
because f˜ is an optimal bound (i.e. there exist strategies arbitrarily close to saturating the bound). If Eve generates
and stores a classical random variable Λ according to the distribution Pr(λ), then implements the corresponding
strategy, the resulting states take the same form as in Eq. (S13),(S14). This is a strategy that achieves probabilities
Pr(ab|xy) = ∑λ Pr(λ)Pr(ab|xyλ), and therefore
f˜(PrAB|XY ) ≥ (1− )d(ρE|00, ρE|11)
= (1− )d
(∑
λ
P˜r(λ)ρE|λ00 ⊗ |λ〉〈λ| ,
∑
λ
P˜r(λ)ρE|λ11 ⊗ |λ〉〈λ|
)
= (1− )
∑
λ
P˜r(λ)d
(
ρE|λ00, ρE|λ11
)
=
∑
λ
Pr(λ)(1− λ)d
(
ρE|λ00, ρE|λ11
)
≥
(∑
λ
Pr(λ)f˜(PrAB|XY λ)
)
− δ.
Since δ was arbitrary, we conclude that f˜(PrAB|XY ) ≥
∑
λ Pr(λ)f˜(PrAB|XY λ), i.e. f˜ is concave on S. Hence choosing
f = f˜ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2. Since f˜ is an upper bound on (1 − )d(ρE|00, ρE|11), we conclude that
when Eq. (6) holds, we have
1− f˜(PrAB|XY )
1−  ≥ 1− d(ρE|00, ρE|11) >

1−  , (S21)
and the claim follows by Theorem 2.
B. EFFECT OF SYMMETRISATION
The argument essentially follows the reduction to Bell-diagonal states in [S11], with slight modifications to account
for the fact that we are bounding fidelity rather than entropy. Denote the single-round state before symmetrisation
as σ. As mentioned in the proof of Theorem 2, we use Jordan's lemma to reduce the analysis to a classical mixture of
qubit strategies, and since each party has only two measurements, we can choose coordinates so that all measurements
lie in the x-z plane. When Alice and Bob measure AxBy and store their results in registers A¯x, B¯y, the resulting
single-round state σA¯xB¯yEΛ is
σA¯xB¯yEΛ =
∑
a,b
∑
λ
Pri(ab|xyλ) Pr(λ) |a, b〉〈a, b| ⊗ σE|λab ⊗ |λ〉〈λ| , (S22)
5where all σE|λab are pure states, and Pri refers to the inital probability distribution before symmetrisation. After the
symmetrisation is carried out via a publicly communicated bit T , we have the state
ρA¯xB¯yETΛ =
∑
a,b
∑
λ
Pr(ab|xyλ) Pr(λ) |a, b〉〈a, b| ⊗ ρET |λab ⊗ |λ〉〈λ| ,
where Pr(ab|xyλ) =
∑
t
1
2
Pri(a⊕ t, b⊕ t|xyλ), ρET |λab =
∑
t
Pri(a⊕ t, b⊕ t|xyλ)
2Pr(ab|xyλ) σE|λ,a⊕t,b⊕t ⊗ |t〉〈t| .
(S23)
The probabilities Pr(ab|xyλ) satisfy∑λ Pr(ab|xyλ)Pr(λ) = Pr(ab|xy), and for each value of λ, we have Pr(00|00λ) =
Pr(11|00λ). In the proof of Theorem 2, we should be considering the state ρ with Eve having access to E and T ,
and eventually need to bound F (ρET |λ00, ρET |λ11), but we would face the problem that the states ρET |λab are not
pure. However, we shall now argue that there exists a state ρ′ which produces the same probabilities Pr(ab|xyλ) and
achieves F (ρ′ET |λ00, ρ
′
ET |λ11) = F (ρET |λ00, ρET |λ11) with pure conditional states ρ
′
ET |λab, essentially by replacing the
classical register T with an appropriate purification. Therefore, we can consider the state ρ′ instead of the state ρ
when bounding F (ρET |λ00, ρET |λ11).
Denoting the pure pre-measurement states σABE|λ as |ψ〉〈ψ|ABE|λ, consider the state
ρ′ABETΛ =
∑
λ
Pr(λ) |ψ′〉〈ψ′|ABET |λ ⊗ |λ〉〈λ| ,
where |ψ′〉ABET |λ =
1√
2
(
|ψ〉ABE|λ ⊗ |0〉+ (Y ⊗ Y ⊗ id) |ψ〉ABE|λ ⊗ |1〉
)
,
(S24)
and let Alice and Bob's devices perform the same measurements as they did on σ. Denote the post-measurement
states after measuring AxBy on |ψ〉ABE|λ and getting outcome ab as |ψ〉E|λab. Since Y ⊗Y acting on Alice and Bob's
systems has the effect of flipping the outcomes of all Pauli measurements in the x-z plane, the post-measurement
state can be found to be
ρ′A¯xB¯yETΛ =
∑
a,b
∑
λ
Pr(ab|xyλ) Pr(λ) |a, b〉〈a, b| ⊗ |ψ′〉〈ψ′|ET |λab ⊗ |λ〉〈λ| ,
where Pr(ab|xyλ) =
∑
t
1
2
Pri(a⊕ t, b⊕ t|xyλ), |ψ′〉ET |λab =
∑
t
√
Pri(a⊕ t, b⊕ t|xyλ)
2Pr(ab|xyλ) |ψ〉E|λ,a⊕t,b⊕t ⊗ |t〉 .
(S25)
This state achieves the same probabilities Pr(ab|xyλ) as ρ in Eq. (S23). In addition, we can verify that the pure
states ρ′ET |λab = |ψ′〉〈ψ′|ET |λab satisfy F (ρ′ET |λ00, ρ′ET |λ11) = F (ρET |λ00, ρET |λ11). Therefore, we can consider this ρ′
in place of ρ.
C. OMITTING THE SYMMETRISATION STEP
To show that the symmetrisation step is not required in practice, we consider two scenarios. The first scenario
describes what happens when a symmetrisation step is applied before carrying out the repetition-code protocol, while
the second scenario describes a case where the repetition-code protocol is carried out without the symmetrisation step,
followed by a few additional operations. By comparing these two scenarios, we can argue that the repetition-code
protocol without the symmetrisation step is still secure.
Let Scenario 1 be defined as follows. Alice and Bob initially have bitstrings A0, B0 of length n, and Eve has
side-information E. Alice generates a uniformly random bitstring T of length n, and sends it to Bob via a public
channel. They use T to compute new bitstrings A˜0 = A0 ⊕ T , B˜0 = B0 ⊕ T , and then perform the repetition-code
protocol on the bitstrings A˜0, B˜0 (which now have symmetrised outcomes). In this case, the message Alice sends is
M˜ = A˜0 ⊕ (C,C, ..., C), and Bob computes B˜0 ⊕ M˜ . For ease of argument in the next steps, we shall suppose that
Alice also privately computesM = A0 ⊕ (C,C, ..., C). At the end of this process, the state capturing all the relevant
information takes the form ρA0B0A˜0B˜0ETMM˜CC′D, with Eve having access to ETM˜D. (To ensure C
′ is always
well-defined, we can assign C ′ to take some null value ⊥ when B˜0⊕ M˜ is not a string of n bits with the same value.)
Now let Scenario 2 be a hypothetical scenario where first, Alice and Bob perform the repetition-code protocol
directly on the bitstrings A0,B0, without symmetrisation. After this is done, Alice generates a uniformly random
bitstring T and sends it to Bob via a public channel, then Alice and Bob use T to privately compute A˜0, B˜0 and M˜
the same way as in Scenario 1. At the end of this process, the state capturing all the relevant information takes the
6form ρA0B0A˜0B˜0ETMM˜CC′D, and the key observation is that this state is exactly the same in both Scenario 1 and
Scenario 2. (The main point to check is whether C ′ and D have the same behaviour in both scenarios, which can be
verified by noting that in fact B˜0 ⊕ M˜ = B0 ⊕M .) However, in this case Eve instead has access to ETMD.
We now note that the three variables T ,M ,M˜ have the property that given the values of any two of them, the value
of the third is fixed. Therefore, we can say thatH(C|ETM ;D = 1) = H(C|ETMM˜ ;D = 1) = H(C|ETM˜ ;D = 1).
(It does not matter whether we are referring to Scenario 1 or Scenario 2 here, since the states describing both scenarios
are identical.) Finally, we can see in Scenario 2 that T is clearly independent of CED, since it was only generated
after the repetition-code protocol was performed, independently of all systems involved in that process. Therefore,
we must have H(C|ETM ;D = 1) = H(C|EM ;D = 1) as well.
To find the values of H(C|EM ;D = 1) and H(C|C ′;D = 1) for the protocol without symmetrisation, we simply
need to consider their values on the final state in Scenario 2, since all the steps carried out after the repetition-code
protocol is completed in Scenario 2 do not change these entropies. As we have argued above, H(C|EM ;D = 1)
in Scenario 2 equals H(C|ETM˜ ;D = 1) in Scenario 1, and so the first term is the same in the protocols with
and without symmetrisation. In addition, since the states described in the two scenarios are identical, the values of
H(C|C ′;D = 1) are also equal.
Overall, this means that the value of H(C|EM ;D = 1)−H(C|C ′;D = 1) for the protocol without symmetrisation
is the same as the value of H(C|ETM˜ ;D = 1) −H(C|C ′;D = 1) for the protocol with symmetrisation. Therefore,
bounding the latter already proves the security of the protocol without symmetrisation, and so our theorems also apply
even without the symmetrisation step. However, note that when applying our theorems in that context, the bounds
on F (ρE|00, ρE|11) or the functions f and g must not be computed based on the unsymmetrised PrAB|XY obtained
directly from parameter estimation, but rather based on the hypothetical distribution that would be obtained after
symmetrisation (which can be easily computed from the unsymmetrised PrAB|XY ).
7D. FULL LIST OF NOISE THRESHOLDS
TABLE S1. Noise thresholds for advantage distillation in various DIQKD scenarios, given by Theorem 1 (for rows (i)(vi)) or
Corollary 1 (for rows (vii)(x)). Unless otherwise specified, the state used for Prtarget is
∣∣Φ+〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2.
Description of Prtarget State and measurements for Prtarget qt ηt
(i) Achieves maximal CHSH value
with the measurements
A0, A1, B1, B2.
A0 = B0 = Z, A1 = X,
B1 = (X + Z)/
√
2, B2 = (X − Z)/
√
2. 6.0% 93.7%
(ii) Exhibits the Hardy paradox
maximally [S15, S16] on
A1, A2, B1, B2, with A0, B0 in the
Schmidt basis.
|ψ〉 = √κ(|01〉+ |10〉) +√1− 2κ |11〉 with κ = (3−√5)/2;
the 0 outcomes correspond to projectors onto
|a0〉 = |b0〉 ∝
(√
1 + 2κ−√1− 2κ) |0〉+ 2√κ |1〉,
|a1〉 = |b1〉 = |1〉, |a2〉 = |b2〉 ∝ √κ |0〉+
√
1− 2κ |1〉.
3.0% 92.6%
(iii) Similar to (ii), but with
measurements optimised for
robustness against limited detector
efficiency.
|ψ〉 = √κ(|01〉+ |10〉) +√1− 2κ |11〉 with κ = (3−√5)/2;
the 0 outcomes correspond to projectors onto
|a0〉 = |b0〉 ∝
(√
1 + 2κ−√1− 2κ) |0〉+ 2√κ |1〉,
|a1〉 = |b1〉 ≈ 0.37972 |0〉+ 0.92510 |1〉,
|a2〉 = |b2〉 ≈ 0.90821 |0〉+ 0.41851 |1〉.
3.2% 92.0%
(iv) Includes the Mayers-Yao
self-test [S17] and the CHSH
measurements.
A0 = B0 = Z, A1 = B1 = (X + Z)/
√
2,
A2 = B2 = X, A3 = B3 = (X − Z)/
√
2. 6.8% 92.7%
(v) Maximally violates the elegant
Bell inequality [S18, S19] with the
measurements A1A3, B0B3.
A0 = B0 = −(X + Y + Z)/
√
3,
A1 = Z, A2 = Y, A3 = X, B1 = (X + Y − Z)/
√
3,
B2 = (X − Y + Z)/
√
3, B3 = (−X + Y + Z)/
√
3.
6.1% 93.6%
(vi) Maximally violates the elegant
Bell inequality [S18, S19] with the
measurements A0A2, B1B4.
A0 = B0 = Z, A1 = Y, A2 = X,
B1 = −(X + Y + Z)/
√
3, B2 = (X + Y − Z)/
√
3,
B3 = (X − Y + Z)/
√
3, B4 = (−X + Y + Z)/
√
3
4.3% 95.5%
(vii) Achieves maximal CHSH value
with the measurements
A0, A1, B0, B1.
A0 = Z, A1 = X,
B0 = (X + Z)/
√
2, B1 = (X − Z)/
√
2. 7.7% 91.7%
(viii) Similar to (vii), but with
measurements optimised for
robustness against depolarising noise.
Measurements are in the x-z plane at angles
θA0 = 0.4187, θA1 = 1.7900, θB0 = 0.8636, θB1 = 2.6340.
9.1% 90.0%
(ix) Similar to (viii), but with the
constraint A0 = B0.
Measurements are in the x-z plane at angles
θA0 = θB0 = 0, θA1 = pi/3, θB1 = 2pi/3.
7.1% 92.3%
(x) Similar to (vii), but with states
and measurements maximising
CHSH violation for each value of
detector efficiency η [S20].
|ψ〉 = cos Ω |00〉+ sin Ω |11〉 with Ω = 0.6224; the 0
outcomes correspond to projectors onto states of the form
cos(θ/2) |0〉+ sin(θ/2) |1〉 with
θA0 = −θB0 = −0.35923, θA1 = −θB1 = 1.1538.
7.3% 89.1%
The Prtarget distributions described in rows (ii),(iii),(x) do not have symmetrised outcomes, and hence their noise
tolerances in the limited-detector-efficiency model are affected by the outcome labelling choice (the labellings chosen
here appeared to be the optimal choices for those measurement angles). For these rows and all limited-detector-
efficiency models, the distribution after applying noise does not have symmetrised outcomes, so a symmetrisation
step was carried out after applying noise. Rows (i)(iii) were computed at level 4 of the NPA hierarchy [S21][S22],
rows (iv)(vi) at level 3, and rows (vii)(x) at level 5 (though in most cases, we found little difference from the values
at level 2). Fig. 1 in the main text was computed at NPA level 2. Optimisations for noise robustness were carried
out with fairly crude numerical methods, so the true optimal values may not have been found. We have not yet
performed a very extensive search of possible choices for Prtarget, so there is still room for exploration of other target
distributions.
8E. DISCUSSION OF ATTACKS
I. Beyond collective attacks
The repetition-code protocol may appear to have a weakness in that if Eve perfectly knows the outcomes (A0, B0)
for any single round in the block, then she also knows the values of (C,C ′). However, we note that parameter
estimation in the protocol should take place on a random subset of the rounds, so Eve cannot know precisely which
rounds will be used for key generation (in any case, if she knew this in advance, she could simply choose to attack
only the rounds where parameter estimation is not performed). Therefore, Eve cannot specifically target one round
in each block. It is true that if Eve's strategy involves measuring a fraction O(1/n) of the rounds to perfectly learn
one outcome pair in each block with high probability, the effect on the estimated parameters is very small if a large
block size n is used. However, in principle this can still be detected asymptotically by using a large sample size (note
that the block size n is independent of the total number of rounds performed in the protocol, because it should be
fixed before the protocol, based on the expected noise level).
More generally, when developing a security proof against non-IID attacks, one can typically include a step in the
protocol where a random permutation is applied to the rounds, making the protocol permutation-symmetric. (This is
purely to simplify the proofs, as the permutation step does not need to be performed in practice, via the arguments
in [S23].) Parameter estimation by sampling a random subset is equivalent to sampling a fixed subset after the
permutation step. For permutation-symmetric protocols with IID tensor-product measurements, quantum de Finetti
theorems can be used to reduce the analysis to IID states, albeit with a dependence on the system dimensions. In the
DI case, this implies that if we assume the system dimensions are finite and the measurements have a tensor-product
structure, then the analysis of non-IID states can at least be reduced to IID states asymptotically, though an explicit
bound on the system dimensions would be needed to obtain finite-size results with this approach. In particular,
it would seem that the blockwise attack strategy described above could be modelled using non-IID states and IID
tensor-product measurements, in which case it cannot give an asymptotic advantage over collective attacks as long as
the protocol can be made permutation-symmetric.
II. The CHSH scenario
Comparing to row (i) to row (vii) in Table S1, it would intuitively seem that using the additional perfectly correlated
measurement in row (i) for key generation can only be beneficial. However, we observed a surprising behaviour in the
scenario of row (i), namely that the bound on d(ρE|00, ρE|11) given by the SDP method becomes trivial even when
there is still a CHSH violation from A0, A1, B1, B2. This contrasts with the behaviour for row (vii), where it appears
that the bound on d(ρE|00, ρE|11) is nontrivial whenever the CHSH violation is nonzero (see Fig. 1 in the main text).
A possible explanation is that since B0 is not critical for Bell violation in row (i), it is less constrained and so Eve can
have more information about its outcome. To support this notion, we now outline a potential attack strategy against
the scenario in row (i) subject to depolarising noise, if the users only measure  and the CHSH value.
For depolarising noise q, we have  = q and S = 2
√
2(1 − 2q) in this scenario, where S denotes the CHSH value
of A0, A1, B1, B2 when the outcomes are labelled as ±1. We shall show that for q ≥ 1/(5 + 2
√
2), there exists an
adversarial distribution Prad(ab|xy) that attains these values of  and S, but allows Eve to perfectly distinguish the
outcome 00 from the outcome 11 on the measurement pair A0B0. Consider a scenario where Eve generates a classical
random variable Λ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and implements one of the following strategies based on the value of Λ:
Λ = 0: The devices implement the ideal singlet state and CHSH measurements for A0, A1, B1, B2, and B0 is in
the basis perfectly correlated to A0. This gives S = 2
√
2 and  = 0.
Λ = 1: The devices implement the ideal singlet state and CHSH measurements for A0, A1, B1, B2, and B0 is in
the basis perfectly anticorrelated to A0. This gives S = 2
√
2 and  = 1.
Λ = 2: The devices implement a classical (completely insecure) distribution attaining S = 2 and  = 0.
Λ = 3: The devices implement a classical (completely insecure) distribution attaining S = 2 and  = 1.
For Λ ∈ {0, 1}, Eve's state is independent of the outcome of A0B0, while for Λ ∈ {2, 3}, Eve perfectly knows the
outcome of A0B0. The resulting distribution Prad(ab|xy) observed by Alice and Bob attains values of S and  that
are related to the distribution of Λ by S = 2
√
2(PrΛ(0) + PrΛ(1)) + 2(PrΛ(2) + PrΛ(3)),  = PrΛ(1) + PrΛ(3). We now
note that if PrΛ(0) = 0, then whenever the outcome of A0B0 is 00 or 11, it must have been the case that Λ ∈ {2, 3}
(since the outcome of A0B0 is always 01 or 10 when Λ = 1), in which case the devices have implemented a completely
9insecure distribution and so Eve knows the outcome perfectly. Finally, we observe that it is indeed possible to have
PrΛ(0) = 0 with  = q and S = 2
√
2(1− 2q), by choosing
PrΛ(1) = 1− 2(2 +
√
2)q, PrΛ(2) = 1− q, PrΛ(3) = (5 + 2
√
2)q − 1. (S26)
All these values are nonnegative when q ∈ [1/(5 + 2√2), 1/(2(2 + √2))] ≈ [12.8%, 14.6%], and hence form a valid
probability distribution. Therefore, Eve can distinguish the 00 and 11 outcomes perfectly for q >∼ 12.8% (the value
q ≈ 14.6% is simply the noise value at which S = 2, so for higher noise values there is already no CHSH violation and
no certification of security).
However, this attack focuses only on producing appropriate values of  and S. It might already be possible to rule it
out by considering the full distribution PrAB|XY instead. In addition, perfectly distinguishing the 00 and 11 outcomes
is not precisely equivalent to a complete attack on the repetition-code protocol, since it is essentially ignoring what
happens in the case where A0 6= B0 in the accepted block, which occurs with small but nonzero probability δn.
Intuitively, this should not affect the efficacy of the attack since δn is small; also, C 6= C ′ for such a block so Bob's
guess C ′ will be wrong in any case. We leave further analysis of this attack for future work. (Note that this attack
cannot be straightforwardly applied to the 2-input 2-output scenarios in Table S1, because for those protocols the
CHSH value includes 〈A0B0〉 directly, and it is impossible to have S = 2
√
2 and  = 0 simultaneously in that case.)
F. SATURATING THE FUCHS-VAN DE GRAAF INEQUALITY
We find that for qubit states ρ and σ, we have F (ρ, σ)2 + d(ρ, σ)2 = 1 if and only if ρ and σ have the same
eigenvalues. To show this, we use the fact that letting the Bloch vectors of the qubit states be ~u and ~v, we have the
following formulas for root-fidelity [S24] and trace distance:
F (ρ, σ)2 =
(
1 + ~u · ~v +
√
1− u2
√
1− v2
)
/2, d(ρ, σ)2 = |~u− ~v|2 /4 = (u2 + v2 − 2~u · ~v)/4, (S27)
where u = |~u|, v = |~v|. Therefore,
F (ρ, σ)2 + d(ρ, σ)2 =
(
2 + 2
√
1− u2
√
1− v2 + v2 + u2
)
/4, (S28)
and solving for F (ρ, σ)2 + d(ρ, σ)2 = 1 yields the unique solution u2 = v2. Hence we conclude that for qubit states,
we have F (ρ, σ)2 + d(ρ, σ)2 = 1 if and only if ρ and σ have Bloch vectors of the same length, which is equivalent to ρ
and σ having the same eigenvalues.
This property does not seem to extend to non-qubit states: for instance, the family of qutrit states ρ = p |0〉〈0| +
(1 − p) |1〉〈1| , σ = p |0〉〈0| + (1 − p) |2〉〈2| with p ∈ [0, 1] instead satisfies F (ρ, σ) = p and d(ρ, σ) = 1 − p, which
saturates the opposite bound in the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequality.
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